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Foreword
HUGH L. Sow~ARDS*
The Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series was
held on February 9, 1979 under sponsorship of the University of

Miami Law Review. The in depth discussion and papers submitted
by the distinguished panelists' form the basis of this timely law
review symposium issue on the proposed Federal Securities Code. 2
The Code represents the first attempt to effect a major revision
of the federal securities laws, which are comprised of six different

statutes enacted by Congress between 1933 and 1940.1 As might be
expected, the piecemeal enactment of these statutes resulted in a

legislative patchwork in which duplicate regulation, overlapping
and inconsistencies are apparent. As long ago as 1951, Professor

Louis Loss predicted that these statutes would be treated "'as a
single piece of legislation.' "I The need for their integrated codification was recognized and the project was undertaken by the Council
of the American Law Institute. Professor Loss, appointed as Reporter, labored for more than nine years with selected advisors and
consultants to prepare the six tentative drafts. At its annual meeting in May 1978, the Institute approved the "Proposed Official
Draft." In 1979, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Asso* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Professor Louis Loss, William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard University; Professor Homer Kripke, Chester Rohrlich Professor of Law, New York University;
Professor George J. Benston, Professor of Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of
Rochester Graduate School of Management; Dean Richard West, Dean and Professor of
Finance, Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth College; Professor Nicholas Wolfson, Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.
2. ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE (Mar. 1978 Proposed Official Draft) [hereinafter cited
as

FED. SEC. CODE].

3. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1976); Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh
(1976); Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-11 (1976); Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976); Investment Company Act of

1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1976); Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 806-1
to b-21 (1976).
4. FED. SEC. CODE xv, n.2, quoting L. Loss, SEcuarris REGULATION vii (1st ed. 1951).
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ciation approved the Code and recommended congressional enactment.
Members of the Securities and Exchange Commission staff
have been reviewing the Code for nearly a year, and their report
and recommendations to the Commission are expected in the near
future. Meanwhile, however, one member of the Commission has
questioned the advisability of enacting the Code. Although refusing
to make any specific judgments until the staff report is submitted,
Commissioner Irving Pollack, a thirty-year veteran of the SEC, suggested that "[p]erhaps the ALI should be dealing with particular
issues or problems that need to be resolved"5 instead of presenting
to Congress something that may be too massive to digest.
It is obvious that the moving force behind this monumental
project is Professor Louis Loss, who is and always has been recognized as the foremost scholar in American securities regulation.
Although praise in that vein was duly accorded him by all panelists
at the Baron de Hirsch Meyer lecture, such a virtuous opening was
a prelude to strong criticism of the Code. It would be less than
honest not to state that the bottom line consensus of the panelists
was negative. To put it bluntly, the Code received an accolade of
brickbats; equally critical assessments have appeared in the press."
One criticism of the Code centered on the inadequate use of
empirical data as drafting guideposts. The economists contended
that empirical studies could and should have been undertaken to
provide current data bases for various provisions of the Code.7 Professor Loss responded to this criticism by stating that it would not
be feasible to make empirical studies of each of the several hundred
questions considered.' The economists also urged that existing empirical data were insufficiently employed by the draftsmen.' Professor Loss, however, indicated that the economists themselves do not
agree on the interpretation of existing studies. Thus, an attempt to
implement the data throughout the Code would have itself created
dissension. 0
5. [1978] 484 Sac. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) AA-2.
6. See, e.g., Anreder, Cut Your Losses? Critics Make a Case Against the Proposed
Securities Code,, Barron's, Feb. 26, 1979, at 7; Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1979, at 16, col. 1;
Miami Herald, Mar. 4, 1979, at F-1, col. 1.
7. Panel Discussion, FourthAnnual Baron de Hirsch Meyer Lecture Series, 33 U. MIAMI
L. REv. 1519 (1979).
8. Id. at 1522-23.
9. West, The Federal Securities Code: Some Comments on Process & Outcome, 33 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1485, 1488 (1979).
10. Panel Discussion, supra note 6, at 1522-23.
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A further criticism concerned the draftsmens' unqualified acceptance of the proposition that disclosure or trading legislation is
necessary.
The economists proposed that the time-honored laws of the
market place adequately protect investors and are more socially
desirable than federal legislation." Admitting the blind acceptance
of the disclosure philosophy, Professor Loss emphasized that the
philosophy underlying the federal securities laws has been established for nearly half a century, and debate before Congress on the
wisdom of its retention would be a fruitless endeavor.' 2
Of the many topics debated,' 3 it is not surprising that the most
controversial area in the federal securities laws and in the panel
discussion is the private offering exemption afforded by section 4(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933. The importance of this exemption can
be exemplified by the fact that in 1969 548 firms, each with a net
worth of less than $5 million, obtained $1.46 billion in capital
through public stock offerings. By 1977, new firms were able to raise
only $30 million a year in this manner." Such an alarming shrinkage
underscores the urgent need for an effective method of obtaining
seed money privately, within the framework of an understandable
and workable exemption from the burdens of the costly and timeconsuming registration requirements. It is of vital importance that
the federal securities laws strike a balance between investor protection and the encouragement of venture capital. The SEC staff is
reportedly angered 5 because the Code permits a "limited" offering
to thirty-five individual purchasers,"' thereby abandoning the longstanding requirements that private offerings be made only to those
persons who are "able to fend for themselves" and who "have access
to the same kind of information that would appear in a registration
statement."' 7
If the press reports on the SEC's staff reaction to this section
11. See Benston, Required Periodic Disclosure Under the Securities Acts and the Proposed Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MIAMi L. Rgv. 1471, 1473 (1979).
12. Loss, Keynote Address: The FederalSecurities Code, 33 U. MiAiu L. REv. 1431, 1451
(1979).
13. Specific areas of controversy included: (1) the liability provisions for directors; (2)
the advance filing and publication requirements for tender offers; (3) the standard of proof
necessary with respect to insider trading violations; (4) the problems involved in public
offerings of securities by control persons; (5) the regulation of sales by block traders; and (6)
the regulation of short-swing transactions by insiders.
14. Miami Herald, Feb. 4, 1979, at 26a, col. 1.
15. Schorr, Overhauling the Securities Laws, Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1978, at 16, col. 3.
16. FED. SEC. CODE § 242(b).
17. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953).
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of the Code are accurate, the reaction is most difficult to understand. First, the real meaning of the section 4(2) as well as its
usefulness are still doubtful after forty-five years of judicial and
administrative gloss. Indeed, one panelist described the situation as
it existed a few years ago as "intolerable.'

'1 8

Moreover, some of the

language in the SEC's appellate briefs in SEC v. Continental Tobacco Co.' caused many lawyers to conclude that in the Commission's view there could never be a private offering of equity securities to individuals. This confusion intensified pressure for a more
objective test of what constituted a private offering and resulted in
the adoption of rule 146 in 1974.20 Although this rule was supposed
to provide a "safe harbor," lawyers and business people soon discovered that the harbor was strewn with jagged reefs.' At best, rule 146
meant more paper work for established companies. But it proved
to be a veritable nightmare to start-up companies seeking to raise
venture capital from individuals. Two and one-half years after
adopting rule 146, the SEC was forced to admit: "[Tihe Commission is aware of criticism that the Rule is hindering the investment
of venture capital, and that as an experiment the Rule is a failure
and should be rescinded."2
Moreover, it is no answer to say that rule 146 is not the
exclusive means of obtaining the section 4(2) exemption. " While it
is possible to proceed under the statute, recent cases under section
4(2), with their conflicting interpretations of access, sophistication
and disclosure, have made that option equally confusing.24 Another
reason the reported adverse reaction of SEC staff members to this
part of the Code is difficult to understand is due to the fact that
section 242(b)(3) provides that in the case of new companies (com18. Kripke, The SEC, The Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1151, 1159 (1970).
19. 463 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972).
20. 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1974). For a detailed discussion of the history leading to rule
146, see Schwartz, Rule 146: The Private Offering Exemption-Historical Perspective and

Analysis, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 738 (1974).
21. For a discussion of some of the problems left unresolved by rule 146, see Royalty &
Jones, The Private Placement Exemption and the Blue Sky Laws-Shoals in the Safe
Harbor, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877 (1976).
22. SEC Release No. 33-5779, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
80,828, at 87,178 (Dec. 6, 1976).
23. SEC Release No. 33-5487, 1 FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 2710 (Apr. 23, 1974). See
generally Comment, Private Placement Exemptions Outside SEC Rule 146, 25 EMORY L.J.
899 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1978); Doran v. Petroleum
Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977); Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591
(5th Cir. 1975); Lively v. Hirschfield, 440 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1971).
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panies other than "one-year registrants"), 5 the Commission, by
rule, may modify the private placement portion of the Code. In
other words, the Commission can "rewrite" the exemption and impose a 146-type rule. Thus, instead of being indignant, the Commission should be delighted.
A frequent criticism is that the Code grants expanded rulemaking powers to the Commission." If this criticism is well-founded, it
is disturbing because we have entered an era in which deregulation
is the order of the day.
Even more disturbing is the possible abuse of rulemaking authority combined with attendant disobedience of statutory commands. In this vein, Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the
Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 7 had this to say on rule
10b-5:18
[Riule 10b-5 was adopted pursuant to authority granted the
Commission under § 10(b). The rulemaking power granted to an
administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather, it is "the
power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress
as expressed by the statute." . . . [The scope of the rule] cannot
exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under §
10(b).11
Indeed, rule 10b-5 is a case in point. It has enabled securities
lawyers in civil liability cases to make an end run around the express
civil liability provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, and, according
to one court, "[t]he use of 10b-5, as encouraged by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, has lead [sic] to the emergence of a
Federal law of corporations. '30 This use of rules to upstage the statutes was noted by Professor Loss in 1966, when he first publicly
suggested a federal securities code: "What has happened to Rule
10b-5 . . . always reminds me of a cartoon of the time showing
Mussolini dictating to his secretary, and the caption was, 'Miss
Baccigalupi, take a law.' ,
Professor Loss, however, approves of the Code's broad grant of
rulemaking authority to the SEC. His justification for this incongru25.

FED. SEC. CODE

§ 299.16.

26. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1979, at 16, col. 2.
27. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
29. 430 U.S. at 472 (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976)).
30. Drake v. Thor Power Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 97 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
31. Loss, History of SEC Legislative Programs and Suggestions for a Lock, 22 Bus. LAW.
795, 796 (1967).
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ity is that "codification is compromise."" Accepting that as true,
one may still criticize his response on two grounds: the price of
compromise is too dear and, in light of the current era of deregulation, granting such rulemaking power, is simply not necessary to
obtain congressional approval of the Code.
No impartial critique of the Code would be complete without
mention of at least one of its many positive features: the registration
of companies rather than securities. There would be one file per
company, and all reports, prospectuses and other documents would
be placed in that file. Once a company has registered, the Code
merely requires the filing of simplified "offering statements" in lieu
of an additional registration statement when the company later
effects a "distribution" of its securities." This author submits that
such simplification, with the attendant reductions in expense and
time, would be a welcome innovation.
In sum, the University of Miami Law Review deserves high
commendation for its selection of the proposed Federal Securities
Code as a timely topic for the Fourth Annual Baron de Hirsch
Meyer Lecture Series and for its valuable contribution to current
legal thought.
32. Loss, supra note 12, at 1435.
33. FED. SEC. CODE Xxvi.

